Fiscal Risk Sharing and Resilience to Shocks: Lessons for the euro area from the US. CEPS Working Document No 2017/07, May 2017 by Alcidi, Cinzia. & Thirion, Gilles
 Cinzia Alcidi is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Economic Policy Unit and Gilles Thirion is 
Researcher at CEPS.  
This paper was prepared in the framework of the FIRSTRUN project, which is financially supported 
by the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 Programme (Project No. 649261).   
CEPS Working Documents give an indication of work being conducted within CEPS’ research 
programmes and aim to stimulate reactions from other experts in the field. The opinions expressed 
in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
official position of CEPS. 
978-94-6138-612-0 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  
© CEPS 2017 
Fiscal Risk Sharing and Resilience to Shocks: 
Lessons for the euro area from the US 
Cinzia Alcidi and Gilles Thirion 
No 2017/07, May 2017 
Abstract 
The classic argument for a euro area (EA) fiscal capacity revolves around the need to “dampen the 
effects of asymmetric shocks”. According to authors who expound this conventional wisdom, the euro 
area (EA) needs a common fiscal capacity along the lines of the ‘US federal fiscal system’ because it lacks 
automatic stabilisers to deal with asynchronous output fluctuations. This paper provides empirical 
evidence to indicate that the abovementioned view largely overstates the stabilising role of US federal 
transfers to states. Despite the absence of a centralised EA stabiliser, the automatic stabilisers in the EA 
bring about a larger degree of insurance against asymmetric shocks (about 20%) than that provided by 
the US federal budget (11%). To some extent, this is attributable to the higher degree of market-based 
risk sharing in the US and to the existence of other public institutions enhancing financial stability and 
private risk sharing in the US. Yet we show that US federal fiscal policy appears to be primarily a stabiliser 
of US-wide shocks, rather than idiosyncratic shocks.  
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Fiscal Risk Sharing and Resilience to Shocks: 
Lessons for the euro area from the US 
Cinzia Alcidi and Gilles Thirion* 
CEPS Working Document No 2017/07, May 2017 
1. Introduction 
The mainstream argument for a euro area ‘fiscal capacity’, understood here as an EA centralised 
automatic stabiliser as opposed to a system of permanent transfers, revolves around the need to 
“dampen the effects of asymmetric shocks”. This conventional wisdom is based on Optimal Currency 
Area theories (Kenen, 1969) and suggests that a common fiscal stabiliser designed along the lines of the 
US federal tax-transfer system would have stabilised incomes in member states hit the hardest, thereby 
avoiding the divergence that unfolded between the south and north in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis.  
It is against this background that the role of the US federal budget - and in particular the unemployment 
insurance (UI) system – has attracted the increasing attention of researchers (e.g. Dullien, 2007) and EU 
institutions (e.g. Four and Five Presidents’ Reports). The US UI system carries theoretically powerful 
features, which at the current economic and political juncture, are considered to be one of the most 
promising proposals for a common fiscal capacity (Andor 2016 and Beblavý and Lenaerts, 2017). First, 
because unemployment benefits are generally considered to be the prime automatic stabiliser: it is a 
highly cyclical and timely spending source by nature, with potentially significant stabilising features. 
Second, it carries political advantages, namely because inter-state risk sharing is a form of insurance 
that does not (theoretically) require a joint borrowing capacity, and hence no treaty change. Third, it 
also embeds a social protection element that is important to the supporters of a social Europe (Andor, 
2016).  
This article sets out to contribute to the debate by questioning the abovementioned hypothesis, namely 
that the euro area (EA) needs a fiscal capacity to improve its capacity to deal with asymmetric shocks. 
Without disputing the need for further fiscal integration in the EA, this analysis takes a critical look at 
the actual insurance role of the US federal budget. The main argument that we seek to develop is that 
euro area policymakers could learn important lessons from the stabilising role of fiscal institutions in 
the United States, but they are not what policymakers typically envision.  
This contribution first quantifies the risk-sharing properties of the US federal tax-transfer system, 
including the unemployment insurance system and compares it to the insurance capacity of euro area’s 
decentralised fiscal policies in the face of asymmetric shocks. We provide a unique and detailed update 
and extensions of two important studies carried out in the late 1990s, namely the work of Asdrubali et 
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al. (1996) on the channels of fiscal risk sharing in the US, and of Arreaza et al. (1998) on the smoothing 
effect of government budgets in EU countries.  
We show that the macroeconomic insurance role of US federal fiscal stabilisers against asymmetric 
shocks - and most prominently the role of UI, is largely overstated in the current debate. EA member 
states feature a higher degree of smoothing of asymmetric shocks (about 20%) than provided by the US 
federal budget insurance through inter-state fiscal risk sharing (11%). Likewise, the role of UI in the US 
barely attains 1 percent against 3 percent in the EA, on average. The larger budgets of euro-area 
member states do not explain this trend alone: in terms of ‘efficiency’ relative to total spending, euro-
area member states also slightly outperform the US.  
We then seek to reconcile these results with the better resilience of the US economy by considering 
two strands of explanations. First, we show that US fiscal policy, due to its largely discretionary 
character, provides non-negligible stabilisation against common shocks as well, most particularly during 
large recessions, which allows internalising externalities related to cross-border demand spill overs.  
Second, we stress that it is crucial to better understand potential interaction effects across private and 
public risk-sharing channels. On the one hand, substitution effects between private and public risk-
sharing channels may prevail. In particular, the high degree of market risk sharing in the US may cause 
a weakening of the insurance role of US fiscal transfers if market mechanisms spread out the effect of 
a state-specific output shock onto other states, thereby protecting state income, consumption, and 
unemployment from output fluctuations. Conversely, possible reinforcing effects across channels are 
likely to be significant as well, for instance through the US Banking Union, and the role of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This points to the need to better understand the different 
interaction dynamics at work across insurance channels in successful and resilient monetary unions like 
the US dollar area in order to derive pertinent policy prescriptions for the EA.  
Finally, we show that contrary to the commonplace assumption, the US UI institutional set-up provides 
limited scope for true inter-state risk sharing. As regards the permanent basic UI programme, the crucial 
role of the federal level lies in the credit line granted to states, which must be repaid with interest. True 
one-way transfers from the federal government only occur through emergency benefit programmes 
which finance ad hoc extensions of the duration and generosity of the basic UI during crises. These 
programmes are discretionary rather than automatic as they require congressional approval. The crucial 
point is that, historically, such transfers have only been activated in the face of US-wide recessions 
(symmetric shocks).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical strategy and provides a 
detailed comparative analysis of the capacity of US and EA11 to buffer asymmetric shocks through 
government budgets. Section 3 extends the results from section 2, including the insurance against 
common shocks, and discusses possible interaction effects across risk- sharing channels. Section 4 sheds 
light on the functioning of the US UI and makes the crucial distinction between federal loans to states 
and outright transfers, and section 5 concludes and draws implications for the euro area. 
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2. Quantifying the capacity of fiscal policy to absorb asymmetric shocks: EA vs US 
2.1 Methodology 
This section empirically gauges the contribution of US and EA fiscal policies in providing insurance 
against asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. Obviously, while fiscal policy remains a domestic 
prerogative in the EA, in the US it embeds a multi-tier dimension across different government levels. 
Since the vast majority of cyclically sensitive fiscal policy items is administered by the US federal budget, 
we assume that the smoothing effects of state and local government budgets is nil and focus exclusively 
on the role of US federal institutions. As such, the entire system of unemployment insurance (UI) is 
treated as purely federal in our empirical exercise, although we will later show that this is technically 
not a fully accurate description of the system. Past studies have shown that the stabilisation capacity of 
states and local government budgets is negligible or even destabilising (eg. Follette & Lutz, 2010, 
Sorensen et al. 2001).1 Conversely, the structural nature of inter-state transfers from the EU budget 
implies that they have negligible stabilising properties in the EA, although their size amount to several 
GDP percentage points in some peripheral countries (e.g. Greece and Portugal).  
In order to measure the insurance role of US and EA government budgets against asymmetric shocks, 
we update the work of Asdrubali et al. (1996) on the channels of risk sharing in the US, and extend the 
study of Arreaza et al. (1999) on the smoothing effect of government budgets in EU countries. In this 
respect, the empirical novelty of the present research is thus to provide updated and further detailed 
estimates of the role of fiscal policy instruments in the US and EA.  
As described in further detail in Annex A, the methodology consists of a simple variance decomposition 
of shock to GDP relative to the average GDP growth in the sample. The advantage of this approach is 
that it allows us to quantify the smoothing effect of different components of the tax and transfer 
systems, and in particular unemployment benefits.  
The empirical analysis is based on the four equations displayed below. As customary in the literature 
(e.g. Afonso and Furceri, 2009, Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2014), they are estimated through OLS, correcting 
for panel heterogeneity and first-order auto correlation. In order to capture the asymmetric nature of 
output shocks, regressions include time fixed (not reported): 
Euro-area – Member state’s budgets  
1) 𝐆𝐨𝐯. 𝐛𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞𝐭: ∆ log 𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − ∆ log(𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐺𝑜𝑣 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖,𝑡   =  𝑎𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝐸 + 𝛽𝑔𝑜𝑣 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
2) 𝐆𝐨𝐯. 𝐛𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞𝐭 𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐦(𝐱): ∆ log 𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 −  ∆ log(𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ± 𝑥)𝑖,𝑡   = 𝑎𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝐸 + 𝛽𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑥∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
US - Net federal transfers to states 
3) 𝐅𝐞𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐭𝐚𝐱 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐟𝐞𝐫𝐬: ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡  =  𝑎𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝐸 + 𝛽𝑔𝑜𝑣 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
4) 𝐅𝐞𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐛𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞𝐭 𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐦 (𝐱): ∆ log 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − ∆ log  (𝑆𝐼 ± 𝑥) =  𝑎𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝐸 + 𝛽𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑥∆ log 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
DNI stands for Disposable National Income in the euro area, SI for US State Income, DSI for Disposable 
state income, and the difference between SI and DSI is net transfers from the federal budget. In the EA, 
                                                     
1 Since most US states have some kind of balanced budget requirement, a decline in state revenues must be matched 
by a reduction in public spending. 
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government saving is the public sector balance. The fiscal policy items (x), either from states or federal 
budgets, take on a positive sign for expenditure, and a negative sign for revenue components. 
What we refer to as the fiscal policy capacity to smooth the impact of output shocks – regardless of the 
level of government involved – is a measure of how fiscal policy attenuates the volatility of consumption 
and income around the average consumption growth at every observed point of time, in response to a 
shock in states’ GDP growth relative to the average. Note that the degree of smoothing by EA national 
policies is measured through member states’ government contribution to the ‘net savings’ of the whole 
economy – i.e. the government budget balance, whereas the overall role of the US federal tax-transfer 
system is measured by the difference between state income and state disposable income.  
The main empirical contribution of this article is to offer a detailed and up-to-date treatment of the 
different fiscal risk-sharing channel in the US – for the first time since the original study of Asdrubali et 
al. (1996), and channels of smoothing through national fiscal policy in the EA. 
2.2 Data description 
The US dataset covers the 50 US states over the period 1960-2013, and all the variables are expressed 
in real and per capita terms. Data have been collected and constructed following the methodology used 
in Asdrubali et al. (1996). For the sake of brevity, this section simply presents the main sources of data 
and the methodology to construct the key variables to this study.2  
Gross state product (GSP) comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and is composed of sales 
or receipts and inventory changes, minus the amount of goods and services consumption from other 
industries or imported from other states.  
State income (SI) is estimated starting from personal income (PI) figures available from the BEA, adding 
personal and employer social contributions and subtracting social security and transfers. Non-personal 
state taxes and state revenues on the state trust funds are also added. Conceptually, state income 
includes all incomes generated within each state, as well as cross-border flows of factor income such as 
wages, dividend, interests and all forms of capital income from abroad. Thus, state income measures 
the amount of resources available for consumption to the residents and the state government in the 
absence of intervention from the federal government.  
Disposable state income (DSI) is the sum of state income plus net federal transfers to the state and 
individuals. Federal transfers include direct transfers to individuals in a state plus federal grants to the 
state government minus the total federal taxes raised in the state (i.e. social security contributions, 
corporate taxes, etc.). Federal grants data are extracted from United States Statistical Abstract, federal 
personal taxes from the BEA, and the different types of federal transfers.  
State consumption includes resident and state government consumption (defined as state revenues 
minus state expenditure). Private consumption is calculated by using per capita annual retail sales by 
state as proxy, which is rescaled to match total private consumption in the US.  
Federal tax and transfers data, obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables 
produced by the BEA, sum up to the difference between DSI and SI. Since data on tax collected at the 
state level are generally not available at a disaggregated level, the allocation of most federal taxes is 
                                                     
2 See the annex to Asdrubali et al (1996) for a detailed description of the data sources.  
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made following the tax foundation weights, as in Asdrubali et al. (1996). We also follow Asdrubali in that 
we treat the entire system of unemployment insurance as if it were fully funded by the federal level. 
Since unemployment insurance trust funds are managed by the Treasury, and largely governed by 
federal legislation (minimum contributions and benefits), they consider unemployment benefit pay-outs 
as negative federal tax, and the unemployment insurance contributions as a federal tax. As discussed in 
the next section, however, this may well overstate the amount of federal risk sharing provided for by 
the federal budget. 
We consider a panel of 11 euro-area countries3 over 1995-2014, using data from the OECD national 
account database. The key variables are GNI, NI, DNI, C and G, which are used to estimate the relative 
effectiveness of the main consumption- and income-smoothing channels. Fiscal variables are also 
extracted from the same dataset, namely: indirect and direct taxes, social contributions, capital taxes, 
subsidies, social benefits, social transfers, government consumption, and employee compensation. 
They roughly add up to net public savings (see Arreaza et al. 1998 and Afonso and Furceri, 2008). In a 
similar vein to Afonso and Furceri (2008) and Darby and Melitz (2008), the analysis of the components 
of fiscal policy is complemented by social expenditure data from the SOCX database collected from the 
same institution. These data are used in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the role of 
the different components of fiscal policy in smoothing output shocks in the EA. Note that for 
consistency, all variables are deflated using the HICP index since most of the abovementioned 
aggregates do not have a deflator.  
2.3 The role of government budgets over time and across budget items 
We estimate the portion of asymmetric output shocks that is absorbed by domestic fiscal policy in the 
euro area and compare it to the role of the federal budget in the US.4 The LHS bars represent the 
estimates from the full sample. While the subsequent sub-periods are estimated through one single 
equation, time dummy variables are interacted with GDP (the independent variable).  
Our estimates (Figures 1 and 2, LHS bars) appear to disprove the widespread view that EA member 
states lack the capacity of the US federal fiscal institutions to stabilise asymmetric output fluctuations. 
On the contrary, EA member states smoothed nearly twice as much of an asymmetric shock (19.8%) as 
the US federal budget did through inter-state risk sharing (11%) between 1995 and 2013.  
Although no previous study (to the best of our knowledge) provided such comparative analysis on the 
respective role of US and EA fiscal policies as asymmetric shock stabilisers, these results are actually in 
line with earlier estimates on the EU and US (e.g. Arreaza et al., 1998 and Asdrubali et al. 1996, 
respectively).5 Hence, although these results appear surprising in light of the debate about the need to 
                                                     
3 We leave out the Baltic States, Slovakia and Slovenia since data are missing for most of the period, as well as 
Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta, given their size and atypical financial sector.   
4 It is worthwhile stressing that evaluating the consumption and income insurance provided by governments, we 
implicitly regard market-based income-smoothing as exogenous, which may not be the case. As will be argued later, this 
calls for great caution in the comparative interpretation of the results, and in particular of the benefits from fiscal risk 
sharing in the US. 
5 Our results for the US are about 2 percentage points lower than in Asdrubali et al. (1996), who consider the period 
1963-1990. Our findings are similar to those of the European Commission (2016) regarding the total role of the federal 
budget. Note that they do not provide estimates for the different sub-components of the budgets.   
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further the EA’s insurance capacity against ‘asymmetric shocks’, they simply confirm that older empirical 
findings are still valid.  
Figure 1. Fiscal risk sharing over time, US                      Figure 2. Fiscal risk sharing over time, EA11 
US – Federal level EA11 - Domestic fiscal policy 
  
Note: The bars represent the percentages of states’ output shocks absorbed through the government budget; federal in the US and domestic 
in the EA. Equations are estimated using OLS with time fixed effects, correcting for AR(1) process in the error term. Standard errors are 
corrected for panel heteroscedasticity.  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from AMECO and BEA (see section 2.1 and Annex A for more details). 
In order to measure the role of fiscal policy as an asymmetric shock absorber during the global financial 
crisis and the sovereign crisis, respectively, and to compare them to ‘normal times’, we provide 
coefficient estimates for three sub-periods.  
Results indicate that fiscal policy played out differently across the Atlantic upon the eruption of the 
global financial crisis in 2008. In the EA, government budgets smoothed 77% of asymmetric shocks 
during the financial crisis in 2008-09, while it remains stable at 10% in the US. On the one hand, the high 
coefficient estimate in the EA must be taken with a pinch of salt given the small size of observations in 
the period 2008-09 combined with a larger variance in output growth. On the other hand, this finding 
is in line with the fact that automatic stabilisers and a joint fiscal stimulus (the European Recovery Act) 
were enacted promptly. As shown in Alcidi et al. (2017a), such a fiscal policy role was particularly 
important as, during the same period, household savings increased, driven by precautionary behaviour, 
and tended to amplify the effect of the GDP shock on the most adversely hit member states.  
This trend reversed dramatically in 2010-13, as the sovereign debt crisis spilled over the entire EA. Fiscal-
smoothing neared zero and was at about 6% in the US. In both cases, asymmetric shocks were poorly 
buffered through the action of fiscal policies. Yet, it is precisely during that period that the fate of the 
US economy and EA started to diverge.  
Overall, the low level of fiscal smoothing in the EA in 2010-13 is consistent with the narrative stating 
that budget consolation measures in EA member states facing a deep recession have led to a collapse 
of fiscal policy-smoothing (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2014). Findings for the US, on the other hand, appear 
at odds with the received wisdom that the US federal budget is significantly more effective in smoothing 
asymmetric shocks than EA countries’ national fiscal policies.  
However, there is a crucial difference between the US and EA that tends to be underplayed in the debate 
on the role of fiscal policy across the Atlantic, namely the lack of market risk-sharing mechanisms in the 
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EA. In the US, about 40 percent of an output shock is absorbed through cross-state capital market 
income flows (Asdrubali et al., 1996). The quasi absence of market risk sharing in the EA may have 
multiple implications, some of which are further discussed in section 3.2.  
First, this means that unplugging fiscal policy in economies hit the hardest can be potentially more 
damaging in the EA than would be the case in the US given the lack of alternative risk- sharing 
adjustment tools. This implies that the relative importance of fiscal policy during crises is larger in the 
EA. Second, in addition to the different degrees of balance between the respective role of public and 
market risk sharing in the US and EA, one must take into consideration potential interaction effects 
among private and public insurance channels. Thus far, research has largely ignored the question of the 
interaction between private and public risk sharing, with the exception of the theoretical accounts 
offered by Farhi and Werner (2015) who point to mutually reinforcing forces between public and private 
insurance. Thus, it may well be the case that the large degree of market risk-sharing results from the 
existence of federal fiscal institutions. Conversely, the large degree of private risk sharing, bolstered by 
strong federal fiscal back up, may also take the burden of smoothing asymmetric shocks away from 
fiscal policy to some extent. 
In Figure 3 we further decompose the channels through which the impact of shocks can be absorbed, 
considering the role of the main governmental budget components. Based on the same approach as 
above, we quantify the response to shocks through tax/revenues, and expenditure (for even more 
detailed regression results, see table B4 and B5 in the annex). In order to single out the effect of 
unemployment benefits, the prime automatic stabiliser, we estimate it separately from the role of other 
government expenditure (i.e. other personal transfers, subsidies, and government consumption).6  
It turns out that government budgets smooth asymmetric shocks through the expenditure side of the 
budget rather than through progressive taxation. Contrary to the commonplace view, unemployment 
benefits are far from being the dominant shock absorber. In fact, they seem to play a negligible role in 
the US, cushioning barely 1% of the effect of an output shock. As can be observed in Table B5 (annex), 
UI contribution are mildly (-0.2 percent) but significantly pro-cyclical. In the EA11, this is relatively much 
larger as unemployment benefits provide 5% of insurance.7 
                                                     
6 A more detailed breakdown is reported in Annex B, Tables B4 and B5. 
7 This fact is well-documented in Deroose et al. (2009), who argue that the bulk of automatic stabilisation does not stem 
from progressive tax codes and unemployment benefits but rather “work through the inertia of discretionary 
expenditure with respect to cyclical swings in output: their share in GDP increases ‘automatically’ in downturns and 
declines in upturns”. 
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Figure 3. Government budget breakdown: revenue, unemployment benefits, 
and other spending (1995-2013) 
 
Note: The bars represent the percentages of states’ output shocks absorbed through the different government budget items. Equations are 
estimated using OLS with time fixed effects, correcting for AR(1) process in the error term.  
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on data from AMECO, SOCEXP (OECD) and BEA (see section 2.1 for more details). 
A number of additional factors can help to explain the larger smoothing role of EA fiscal policy over the 
US federal fiscal system. First and foremost, most federal fiscal transfers to states, and in particular 
grants, are structural (and often pro-cyclical) rather than cyclical in nature and have little to do with 
buffering state-specific macroeconomic fluctuations (Kirkegaard, 2015). Second, fiscal policy in the US 
has historically relied more heavily on discretionary fiscal policies than on automatic stabilisation 
compared to the EA.  
Finally, the argument could be made that comparing the insurance effects of fiscal policy in the US and 
the EA to asymmetric shocks requires taking into account the size of fiscal spending. Most EA member 
states are characterised by large welfare state and larger automatic fiscal stabilisers. Direct transfers to 
individuals are twice as large in EA11, at about 20% (AMECO 2017, see annex B1-3)) as they are in the 
US, about 10% in the US8 (BEA, 2017). As it turns out, the more minimalist character of the US welfare 
state compared to EA welfare states only partially accounts for the lower level of asymmetric shock 
absorption through fiscal policy in the US. In effect, when adjusting the coefficient estimate of fiscal 
policy by spending size, we find that the larger budgets of euro area member states do not explain this 
trend alone. Indeed, the ‘efficiency’ of euro area member states’ and the U.S federal budgets are 
broadly in line. Nevertheless, the EA outperforms the US when it comes to the effect of individual 
transfers and in particular unemployment benefits, which are significantly more effective in dealing with 
shocks in the EA. 
Core vs periphery 
Since the lack of a euro area fiscal stabiliser is often cited as having fostered north-south (or surplus vs. 
deficit) divergences (Andor, 2016) this section provides separate estimates for core and periphery 
member states. In order to measure the difference in the two groups of countries (periphery vs core), 
we used two dummies for each group of countries that we interact with the independent variable. This 
allows us to obtain two coefficients (for a similar methodology, see Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2014).  
                                                     
8 See Tables B1 through B3 in Annex B for stylised facts on the different elements of the US and EA11 budgets. 
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Not surprisingly: our estimates reveal that fiscal insurance is weaker in the periphery of the EA: direct 
fiscal transfers stabilise twice as much in the core (27%) as in the periphery (11%). Unemployment 
benefits smooth out about 7% of an asymmetric shock in the core, which is about twice as much as in 
the periphery, and is seven times larger than in the US. More detailed results (not reported) suggests 
that this gap was widened dramatically during the sovereign debt crisis, most likely due to the fiscal 
adjustment in the periphery as a result of the sudden stop and resulting loss of market access.  
The large exacerbation in the differential between periphery estimates prior to the crisis and during the 
sovereign crisis suggest that, as far as macroeconomic stabilisation is concerned, what is primarily 
needed in the EA is an insurance mechanism against ‘catastrophic shocks’ that can potentially impair 
access to financial markets (Gros, 2014). 
 
Note: The bars represent the percentages of states’ output shocks absorbed through the different government budget items. Equations are 
estimated using OLS with time fixed effects. Core countries are Belgium, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and France. Periphery 
countries are Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland.  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from AMECO, SOCEXP (OECD). See data description in section 2.1 for more details. 
US states: rich vs poor, and net recipients vs contributors  
In contrast to the large gap between the periphery and the core, the amount of fiscal inter-state risk 
sharing in the US appears highly homogenous across rich/poor as well as net recipient/contributor of 
federal funds (not reported). In other words, poorer states, defined as those below the median GSP per 
capita, feature similar degrees of smoothing through the federal budget than ‘richer’ states. The same 
observation holds when distinguishing between net recipients and net contributors of federal transfers. 
This reflects the fact that most transfers are not designed to achieve fiscal risk sharing or stabilise 
asynchronous output fluctuations. The latter are rather driven by the structural nature of the transfer 
system, whereby variables such as state income level, demographics, or the presence of US military 
bases and other federal institutions are the main determinants of federal transfers. As far as the 
unemployment insurance (UI) system is concerned, findings suggest that the US system does not 
disproportionally benefit the poorer states in terms of stabilisation capacity, despite different levels of 
structural unemployment and output growth rates. 
3. Fiscal insurance from the US federal budget: beyond ‘asymmetric shocks’ 
The empirical results presented in section 2 prompt us to rethink the function of fiscal institutions in 
monetary unions beyond their individual role in buffering asymmetric shocks. In order to test the 
possibility that the US federal tax-transfer system mainly serves as common insurance, section 3.1 
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measures the degree of insurance against ‘common shocks’ and compares it to insurance against 
asymmetric shocks. In section 3.2 we discuss potential interaction effects between private risk sharing 
and fiscal risk sharing in the US through unemployment insurance.    
3.1 Fiscal policy and common shock insurance 
In order to account for the degree of fiscal insurance against output fluctuations across all states, we 
adapt the econometric specification used in the previous sections in the vein of Poghosyan et al. (2015), 
except that here we go one step further and quantify the effect of the different government tools such 
as the US unemployment insurance. Specifically, to identify the common stabilisation effect of the US 
federal budget, we estimate similar equations to those presented previously without controlling for the 
effect of shocks affecting all states simultaneously. We interpret these new regression coefficients as 
the amount of insurance to protect against asymmetric and symmetric shocks altogether. The 
difference between these estimates and those with time fixed effect (presented earlier) should thus 
correspond to a measure of the response to the common shock. This strategy is particularly interesting 
in the case of the US to identify the stabilisation capacity at federal level against common shocks as 
opposed to inter-state risk sharing against asymmetric shocks.  
Figure 4. Government budget breakdown: asymmetric and symmetric shock absorption, 
US vs EA (1995-2013) 
 
Note: The bars represent the percentages of state’s output shocks absorbed through the different government budget items. Equations are 
estimated using OLS with time fixed effects, correcting for AR(1) process in the error term.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from AMECO, SOCEXP (OECD), and US bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA (see section 2.1 for more 
details). 
Comparing figures 4 and 3 (previous section) reveals that, on average, insurance increases from 11% to 
18% in the US and from 20% to 28% in the EA when time fixed effects no longer control for the portion 
of shocks affecting all states simultaneously. Insofar as unemployment benefits are concerned, the 
degree of insurance increases from 1% to 3% in the US, suggesting that most of the effect of the US UI 
is felt in the common portion of the shock. On the other hand, the measured smoothing effect of 
unemployment benefits in the EA11 remains unaltered. 
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Since insurance against (total) output shocks is associated with business-cycle movements, the 
stabilising effect of US fiscal policy against common fluctuations is likely to vary significantly over time. 
In order to capture the patterns of inter-state risk sharing and total fiscal smoothing - i.e. including 
common shocks - over time, Figure 5 reports 5-year rolling window estimates measuring: 
 Federal inter-state risk sharing (as measured in the previous section, grey line on the LHS scale) 
 Total federal fiscal insurance to shocks9 (light blue line, LHS scale),  
 Total Insurance of the UI system to shocks (dashed blue line, RHS scale).  
Figure 5. US smoothing via federal budget over time (5-year rolling window): 
inter-state risk sharing vs total shock absorption (1990-2013) 
Note: The lines represent the percentages of states’ output shocks absorbed through the different government budget items using a 5-year 
rolling-window approach. Thus, 1990 corresponds to the coefficient for the period 1986-1990, and so forth. Equations are estimated using 
OLS with time fixed effects, correcting for AR(1) process in the error term. Inter-state risk sharing is estimated controlling for common shocks 
(time FE), whereas the total insurance is estimated without controlling for shocks hitting all states simultaneously. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from BEA (see section 2.1 for more details).  
The evidence in Figure 5 points to two dynamic features of US fiscal policy: a strong association between 
total fiscal insurance and the business cycle – i.e. booms and busts – and a steady, yet declining degree 
of fiscal risk sharing across states. The latter finding runs counter to our expectation. In particular, the 
decreasing trend in fiscal risk sharing throughout the crisis indicates that the role of fiscal policy was 
increasingly towards common stabilisation rather than transferring resources to the most distressed 
states in order to smooth asymmetric shocks.    
The discretionary fiscal stimuli enacted by Congress during periods of recessions (e.g. 2001-02 and 2008-
09) stabilised US-wide fluctuations rather than asymmetric shocks. Stimulus packages also typically 
extend the duration and coverage of unemployment benefits. As a result, the total smoothing effect 
(dashed blue line) of US unemployment benefits is on average three times larger (from 1 to 3%) when 
common output fluctuations in the US are included, and fluctuates at around 5% during episodes of 
crisis. As can be observed by comparing the two blue lines, the degree of insurance provided through 
                                                     
9 By that we mean insurance against the asymmetric and symmetric portion of output changes. 
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unemployment insurance features a remarkably similar dynamic to the one of the total US budget, 
driven by episodes of boom and bust.  
The bottom line is that this fact contradicts one of the most enduring myths about the US fiscal union, 
namely that the US fared better during the financial crisis as a result of the capacity of the US federal 
tax-transfer system to transfer resources to states most hit during the financial crisis. Rather, it seems 
that fiscal reactions to crises in the US carry an important element of insurance against common shocks. 
It is important to stress that joint fiscal expansion is not a zero-sum game on aggregate: it also allows 
cross-border fiscal policy externalities to be internalised, namely the effect of demand stimulus on states 
that are trade partners (Thirion, 2017). 
3.2 Market and public risk-sharing mechanisms: Substitutes or mutually reinforcing?10 
Another feature that tends to be overlooked in the debate on the respective merits of fiscal and private 
risk sharing mechanisms is that the US Dollar area is characterised by much larger degrees of private 
risk sharing through asset portfolio diversification across states. Although often neglected, this 
distinction is likely to be just as important as the existence of a federal tax-transfer system when it comes 
to understanding how certain features of the US monetary union enhance its resilience compared to 
the EA.  
As mentioned previously, the variable development of private risk-sharing mechanisms in the EA and 
US is substantial: about 40% of an output shock in the US is shared through capital market diversification 
in the US (Asdrubali et al., 1996)) for about 5% in the EA (Furceri and Zdzienicka 2013, Alcidi et al., 
2017a). This means that the losses of failing businesses in one state are systematically borne out by 
investors in other states. This raises the question of how far the demand for fiscal insurance against 
asymmetric shocks is influenced by the existence of private risk-sharing mechanisms.  
Figure 6 displays the standard deviation in real GDP growth rates for the US and the EA. It indicates that 
growth rate dispersion is larger among US states than in the EA11, with the exception of the sovereign 
debt crisis (2011-12) and 2003. Interestingly, in 2008-11, dispersion declined, whereas it sharply 
increased in the EA. The underlying message behind these stylised facts, and in particular the larger 
output dispersion observed across US states, is that diversity in a monetary union is not necessarily a 
weakness as long as there are a number of insurance mechanisms to deal with risks. One can thereby 
turn economic diversity into an opportunity to diversify and share risks in a mutually beneficial way 
(Schelkle, 2017).  
Interestingly, the opposite pattern prevails when considering the dispersion of changes in 
unemployment rates in the US and the EA.11 Dispersion is consistently lower in the US than in the EA. In 
addition, with the exception of 2008-09, it has remained remarkably stable over time in the US, contrary 
to the double-dip surge in the dispersion of unemployment rates among EA11 countries during the 
crisis. 
                                                     
10 The rest of the article partly draws from Alcidi and Thirion (2017), “The stabilising role of US federal fiscal institutions: 
What lessons for the euro area”, Intereconomics Forum, May.  
11 We opt for changes in unemployment rates to eliminate differences in the level of structural unemployment, which 
are probably higher in the EA than the US due to greater diversity in labour market structures. 
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Figure 6. Real GDP growth standard deviation Figure 7. Unemployment rate change standard 
deviation 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ compilation based on Eurostat and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
The combination of high output growth dispersion and low dispersion of unemployment rate changes 
in the US can appear puzzling at first sight. Indeed, the lower degree of employment protection in the 
US labour markets compared to the EA should lead to higher cyclical unemployment movements 
(Bertola, 2009), and hence to a higher dispersion in changes in unemployment. However, the large 
amount of inter-state risk sharing through capital and credit markets in the US may as well help buffer 
income and consumption from idiosyncratic output fluctuations, thereby explaining why output shocks 
do not necessarily translate into a surge in unemployment.12  
In addition to the better capacity to share risks, possible differences in the nature of shocks hitting the 
US and EA may also explain divergences. Risk-sharing mechanisms are typically more effective in the 
face of transitory shock. Hence, if shocks are more persistent in the EA than in the US (Alcidi et al., 
2017b), output shocks typically materialise in unemployment and the real economy. This would explain 
higher dispersion in unemployment growth rates in the EA. Labour mobility may also play a more 
favourable role in the US than in the EA. This is the classical adjustment mechanism to asymmetric 
shocks in the OCA theory, and historically mobility has been much stronger in the US than in the EA. 
Overall, there are relevant reasons to believe that there is a causal link between high market risk sharing 
and low public risk sharing in the face of asymmetric shocks. In other words, they may be substitutes. 
Nevertheless, there may also be mutually reinforcing dynamics between market and public risk sharing. 
Surprisingly, the extent and nature of these interactions have thus far been the subject of little scrutiny 
in the debate, which tends to consider the different risk-sharing channels in isolation.  
Yet, federal fiscal institutions can reinforce the market’s willingness to share risks, hence further 
contributing to stability. In this sense, by evaluating fiscal insurance provided by the US federal 
                                                     
12 The idea that US risk-sharing institutions buffer employment from output shocks is supported by the fact that state 
unemployment rates are weakly correlated with states output growth (-.15) whereas national output and 
unemployment changes are significantly and negatively correlated (-0.4).  
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government against asymmetric shocks, we implicitly regard market-based income smoothing as 
exogenous to other institutions (fiscal or not) that help managing markets. It is however largely 
implausible that such outcome can be considered as exogenous due to likely positive non-measurable 
benefits from fiscal risk-sharing institutions (e.g. Federal Deposit Insurance Company – FDIC) on private 
risk sharing in the US.  
4. The US unemployment insurance: A semi-automatic stabiliser with limited risk pooling? 
The idea that the US federal budget is on average better equipped than EA member states to smooth 
out idiosyncratic output fluctuations is not the only myth about the US fiscal union. Another one 
concerns the idea that the US unemployment insurance (UI) system is a unitary and centralised 
insurance scheme with significant and permanent inter-state solidarity. As will be shown in this section, 
in reality, by treating all unemployment benefit spending as ‘federal’ in nature, the estimates of the 
insurance effects of the US UI against asymmetric are likely to overestimate the true level of inter-state 
risk sharing.  
Contrarily to what is often assumed, the semi-decentralised nature of the US UI system limits the scope 
for true inter-state risk sharing by leaving most of the funding prerogatives to states. In fact, mechanisms 
for true federal risk sharing in the US are essentially deployed in the face of large common shocks. This 
section discusses the most relevant features of the US UI system. For an overview of the different US UI 
programmes and their triggers, see Annex B6. 
For starters, the US UI institutional setup was deliberately chosen and designed to limit the degree of 
risk pooling and to allow states freedom over the design of UI schemes, unlike the fully centralised UI 
system introduced by its Canadian neighbour under roughly the same circumstances (Beramendi, 2008). 
Compared to a fully centralised system, the US system embeds two relevant particularities. First, UI 
programmes are administered at the federal level by the US Department of Labor, which sets broad 
guidelines and minimum common standards that state programmes must follow. Hence, the ultimate 
design and implementation is left to the discretion of states, which results in important differences in 
the prerequisites, duration, and generosity of benefits among states.13  
The hybrid nature of the scheme is reflected in its funding structure, which significantly restricts the 
scope for inter-state solidarity. The system is normally funded by state and federal payroll taxes 
collected from employers, which are both channelled into the relevant accounts of the federal 
Unemployment Trust Fund by the US Treasury. The federal tax rate (Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 
FUTA) is 6% of the first $7.000 paid to each employee, but a tax credit of 5.4% is granted to states that 
comply with federal rules (i.e. have implemented a UI system),14 Thus the effective rate is a meagre 
0.6%.  
Hence, as can be inferred from Figure 8 (below), the bulk of the basic US UI system, which covers up to 
26 weeks of unemployment, is financed through the state tax (SUTA). The state tax collection tends to 
fluctuate along the business cycle, with some degree of pro-cyclicality in the collection of state taxes, 
                                                     
13 Note that workers only receive unemployment benefits from the state where they used to be employed. The 
maximum state-provided benefits range from $235 in Mississippi to $679 in Massachusetts. 
14 The tax credit was initially created as an incentive to encourage states to set up unemployment insurance schemes. If 
a state refused to implement UI, it would result in all the firms based in that state paying a 6% tax while not receiving 
any federal transfers. 
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which increased in the years following the dotcom crisis, and the outbreak of the financial crisis. This 
points to the pro-cyclical bias of loan repayment after state’s funds borrowed from the federal level in 
order to finance spending on basic unemployment insurance during periods of crisis.   
Figure 8. UI contributions: FUTA, SUTA and additional net federal contributions 
 
Data source: US Department of Labor (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44527.pdf). 
On average, unemployment benefit spending accounts for about 0.2-0.3 % of US GDP during ‘non crisis’ 
times. However, the cost rises to 0.5- 1% of GDP in the wake of recessions. As a point of comparison, 
spending on unemployment benefits amounted to about 1.5% of GDP in 1995-2013 in the euro area 
(OECD), and 2% of GDP in 2008-2013 on average (see Annex B1-3).15 The large variations in UI spending 
reflect the responsiveness of the system to large economic recessions, which tends to increase spending 
proportionally more than in the euro area. Spending on basic unemployment compensation, the 
permanent unemployment benefit program, virtually accounts for the total amount of expenditure 
when no significant symmetric shock affects the US economy. What is crucial is that the payment of 
basic unemployment benefits in the US does not involve any inter-state risk sharing. It rather allows for 
inter-generational risk sharing with future generations within a given state, which is why our empirical 
results that treat all benefits and contributions as ‘federal’ may technically overestimate the amount of 
inter-state risk sharing. 
The extended benefit program (grey bar), which extends benefit duration in states facing periods of high  
unemployment, is the only permanent mechanism designed to provide inter-state risk sharing through 
a federal fund (EUCA) that provides transfers covering 50% of the cost of extended weeks of benefits. 
The programme is triggered by different indicators of a state’s unemployment level, which makes it in 
principle well-suited to deal with significant state-specific shocks. However, it has historically accounted 
for a modest amount of total UI outlays. 
                                                     
15 Higher sensitivity of UB spending in the US can be explained by difference in labour market structures, and in particular 
the higher level of labour market flexibility in the US, which amplifies the reaction of unemployment rates to large 
movements in the business cycle as compared to most EA countries.  
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Figure 9. UI expenditure by programme and net federal support (% of US GDP) 
 
Note: Due to data restriction, the variable basic UC includes spending on extended benefits prior to 2000. 
Sources: BEA, NIPA tables (prior to 2000), and US Department of Labor (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44527.pdf). 
The federal budget can provide additional funding in two different ways (see 'net federal contribution’ 
in Figure 9, red dotted line). 
 Providing loans through the Treasury to finance states’ basic unemployment insurance.  
This occurs when states trust funds run out of funds, typically during spells of prolonged high 
unemployment, and borrow from the federal level to fund unemployment benefits. It is thus a varying 
fraction of the light blue bar on Figure 9. This system does not, strictly speaking, involve inter-state risk 
sharing since loans must be repaid after two years against an interest, which induces some mild pro-
cyclicality in UI financing. The system is thus best understood as federal re-insurance instrument that 
guarantees unemployment benefit payments in hard times.  
 Outright transfers to finance Emergency Benefits (requires action by Congress). 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) schemes (dark blue) provide genuine (discretionary) 
fiscal transfers, but to individuals not states. These transfers finance additional weeks of unemployment 
benefits to those individuals who have exhausted regular state benefits during periods of US-wide 
recessions.16 As can be observed from Figure 9 (dark blue), this programme typically finances the bulk 
of the increase in benefit spending during crises.  
While these are genuine transfers, since they must not be repaid by states, emergency programmes are 
characterised by their discretionary rather than automatic nature. As such it has historically been 
activated in the face of US-wide recessions (symmetric shocks), which may explain why the US UI system 
does not seem to provide significant insurance against asymmetric shocks.  
                                                     
16 The most recent example of an EUC scheme was from June 2008 until the end of 2013. 
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5. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
The estimation of the macroeconomic insurance role of US federal fiscal stabilisers against asymmetric 
output fluctuations, and most prominently the role of unemployment insurance, tends to be largely 
overstated in the current debate on the design of an EA fiscal union. 
As such, our results also points to the limitations of policy prescriptions derived by looking at the US 
fiscal union as a guide for the EA through the single lens of ‘asymmetric shock’ absorption, as prescribed 
by the OCA theory. The main issue with this narrative is not so much that it overstates the performance 
of US federal automatic stabilisers in buffering asymmetric output shocks, but that it is fundamentally 
too narrow an understanding of the stabilising role of US federal fiscal institutions. In order to illustrate 
this point, the analysis has highlighted three important – but rarely mentioned – features of U.S federal 
fiscal institutions which should be seriously taken into account in order to better understand the source 
of the resilience of the US dollar monetary union. 
First, the coexistence of different private and public risk-sharing mechanisms, some of which are hardly 
measurable (e.g. the effect of the FDIC), imply that the low amount of inter-state fiscal risk sharing may 
well be attributable to the effective action of other insurance mechanisms – public or private – that 
spread the consequences of shocks in the US, and thereby reduce the need for inter-state fiscal 
stabilisation.  
Second, the discretionary character of US fiscal policy, including US UI, makes it de facto better suited 
to deal with large US-wide recessions than state-specific shocks. This suggests that the main benefits 
from an EA fiscal stabiliser could also arise in the face of large common output fluctuations, when the 
positive externalities of fiscal policy stimuli can be internalised through a centralised fiscal policy 
instrument.  
Third, the design of the US UI system is such that the scope for inter-state risk sharing is essentially 
restricted to large US-wide crises. Indeed, as far as the basic UI scheme is concerned, the main role of 
the federal government lies in granting states with permanent access to a line of credit from the US 
Treasury. Transfers from the federal government require congressional approval and occur only when 
Congress passes a fiscal stimulus bill in the face of an US-wide economic recession.    
Nevertheless, none of the above makes the US fiscal system a less meaningful guide for the design of a 
euro-area fiscal capacity. On the contrary. The US UI shows that ex ante re-insurance of decentralised 
basic UI schemes can be achieved such that it limits the degree of inter-state solidarity to a large extent, 
while allowing for outright transfers in the face of large shocks. The US system thus provides some 
interesting insights into how to provide insurance against the risk that EA member states end up being 
forced to cut back social benefits when they are faced with difficulties in accessing financial markets. 
The latter point would be the single-most important value added of an EA stabiliser from a 
macroeconomic and social point of view. This would also support the internalisation of demand 
externalities, hence generating positive effects across the entire EA. 
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Annex A. The decomposition methodology  
Risk-sharing mechanisms in monetary unions 
The effectiveness of smoothing mechanisms among the euro area member states and US is estimated 
using the approach of Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Sorensen and Yosha (1998), who provide an integrated 
framework to quantify the relative amount of inter-regional risk sharing.  
The framework, which is equally applicable to regions, states or countries, distinguishes between three 
different channels for smoothing consumption and income among regions or countries. For simplicity 
let us describe the framework assuming a cross-country scenario.17 First, individuals and firms can insure 
themselves against income shocks via the cross-ownership of assets by using the international capital 
market. This channel is captured by international factor income, which is the difference between GDP 
and GNI and corresponds closely to the primary investment income recorded in the balance of payment. 
Secondly, government transfers (fiscal risk sharing) can also smooth income if net transfers to regions 
or countries are larger when hit by a negative shock. Although such transfers may be influenced by other 
motives than risk sharing, a system of federal tax, transfers and grants in federations is typically designed 
to help absorb the negative effects of asymmetric shocks. In most cases, automatic transfers and/or 
benefits (e.g. unemployment insurance) are activated under certain conditions.  
Finally, inter-temporal risk sharing through savings or borrowing in domestic or international credit 
markets also contribute to inter-regional consumption smoothing. Saving and borrowing allow the 
smoothing of consumption over time through the business cycle, as governments, households and firms 
can save or dis-save.18 The fraction of shocks left unsmoothed is the remainder, which is captured by 
the correlation between GDP and final consumption. 
In order to measure the effect of these channels, GDP (in the case of EA countries) or GSP (in the case 
of US states) is thus disaggregated into the following national (state) accounts aggregates: 
 GDP-GNI =international capital and labour income transfers (factor income flows) 
 NI-NNDI = net international taxes and transfers 
 NNDI-(CONS) = total savings 
 GNI-NI = capital depreciation 
 
Where 𝑖 is an index of countries while GDP is decomposed in: Gross National Income (GNI), National 
Income (NI), Net National Disposable Income (NNDI) and total consumption (CONS) that is equal to the 
sum of private (C) and government (G) consumption. All variables are measured in real and per capita 
                                                     
17 The methodology used for US states is similar to the exception that capital depreciation is included in international 
factor income. Other differences between the US state and EA data is discussed in the next section.  
18 Intertemporal consumption smoothing can embed an international component, but this is not necessarily the case in 
reality. Decomposing domestic and international smoothing, Alcidi et al. (2016) show that the bulk of consumption 
smoothing is achieved domestically, via adjustments in domestic investment rather than externally, via cross-border 
flows of assets (as reflected in financial accounts). 
22  ALCIDI & THIRION 
 
terms. The difference between GDP and GNI, NI and NNDI, NNDI and Consumption represent the three 
risk-sharing channels outlined above.  
Net factor income comprises income from productive assets, such as FDI, equity and debt securities, 
loans but also labour income. The second channel, the fiscal insurance channel, reflects taxes and 
transfers, accounting for the difference between income and disposable income. Net savings comprise 
households, government and corporate savings. A fourth channel, capital depreciation, also contributes 
to the smoothing of shocks to GDP.19  
We implement a cross-sectional variance decomposition of shocks to GDP to measure the relative 
smoothing capacity of the various channels of absorption. We start from the following national account 
identity, valid for each year and each country (or region) under analysis:   
  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 =
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐼
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑖
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖
∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖  (1) 
 
The interpretation of this equation is that the effect of a shock hitting an economy, affecting its GDP, 
can be smoothed in the economy if some counter-cyclical movement in other economic aggregates 
prevents corresponding swings in total consumption. In particular, full stabilisation is achieved is a shock 
to GDP growth does not lead to any variation in the consumption growth rate. This implies that one of 
the four ratios must move positively with GDP. For instance, the ratio 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
 will be positively correlated 
with GDP if there is some degree of income smoothing via international factor income, and 
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝑁𝐼𝑖
 will be 
positively associated with GDP movements if depreciation of capital provides further income smoothing. 
In the case that transfers from the federal level, or some EU institution provide income smoothing, 
𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑖
should move positively with GDP. Similarly, 
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑖
𝐶𝑖+𝐺𝑖
 should be positively related to GDP if saving and 
borrowing provide additional consumption smoothing. Any remaining positive co-movements between 
total consumption and GDP indicate that some part of output shocks is not smoothed. 
To derive the equations to be estimated, we start from equation (1), take logs and difference and 
multiply both sides by Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 (minus its mean for each time period) to obtain: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 (Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 , Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 − Δ log 𝐺𝑁𝑃)   +
                                     𝑐𝑜𝑣 (Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 , Δ log 𝐺𝑁𝑃 − Δ log 𝑁𝐼    )   +
                                     𝑐𝑜𝑣 (Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 , Δ log 𝑁𝐼     − Δ log 𝐷𝑁𝐼)    +
                                     𝑐𝑜𝑣 (Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 , Δ log 𝐷𝑁𝐼 − Δ log 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆) +
                                     𝑐𝑜𝑣 (Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃 , Δ log 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆)   
Dividing by 𝑣𝑎𝑟(Δ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃) we obtain the following system of independent equations with time fixed 
effects: 
                                                     
19 In principle, capital depreciation could be an effective channel of smoothing: during booms, capital tends to depreciate 
faster because of more intense utilisation while the opposite occurs during recessions. However, capital depreciation is 
measured following fixed accounting rules, usually leading to a pro-cyclical behaviour for this channel. 
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𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟: ∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − ∆ log 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡   =  𝑎𝑡
𝑖𝑓 + 𝛽𝑓∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: ∆ log  𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡   −  ∆ log 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡  =  𝑎𝑡
𝑑 + 𝛽𝑑∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠: ∆ log 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − ∆ log 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎𝑡
𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠: ∆ log 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  −  ∆ log 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎𝑡
𝑠 + 𝛽𝑠∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: ∆ log 𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎𝑡
𝑐 + 𝛽𝑐∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     
where 𝛽𝑓 + 𝛽𝑑 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠 + 𝛽𝑢= 1 and the 𝛽 coefficients are the OLS estimates of the slope in the 
cross-sectional regressions. We present panel correct standard errors, and in order to account for 
possible autocorrelation in the residuals, we assume that the error follows an AR(1) process. We do not 
impose any constraint on the 𝛽s: a positive coefficient measures the smoothing effect of a given 
channel, a negative coefficient indicates that the channel has a di-smoothing effects. For instance, if 
international fiscal transfers increase during an economic upturn, this flow of resources will increase 
the disposable income, amplifying the initial shocks on GDP.  
The regression’s coefficients are to be interpreted in the following way: 𝛽𝑠 capture the percentage of 
shocks absorbed by the various smoothing channels; 𝑎𝑡   denotes the time-fixed effects, controlling for 
year-specific effects on growth rate. With the introduction of time fixed effects, we control for shocks 
on aggregate GDP, while the 𝛽 coefficients are weighted averages of the yearly cross-sectional 
regressions. This is because we only want to include country specific shocks, removing the aggregate 
component, which is by definition not insurable among the countries in the sample. 
One crucial feature of the present empirical analysis is that our two samples feature respectively EA11 
countries and the 50 U.S states, and thus somehow implicitly envisions the sample as a ‘closed world’. 
While this might sound trivial, this means that the introduction of time fixed effects removes the 
aggregate component from the growth rates of the countries present in the sample, not based on the 
world output fluctuations. Thus, the implication of the time fixed effects is that GDP shocks at the 
country (state) level are defined as deviations from the (unweighted) sample average output growth 
rate.20 Countries (states) can experience (relative) positive and negative shocks no matter whether all 
countries are, say, in a recession or boom at the same time.   
Consumption smoothing through fiscal policy in the EMU 
In order to quantify the amount of consumption smoothing through the different fiscal policy 
instruments that make up the government saving in EA11 member states, we consider the following 
equation: 
𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖
 
                                                     
20 The lack of weights partly constitutes a caveat of the model, which is not mentioned in the literature, surprisingly. 
Thus, we have performed a similar analysis departing from the time fixed effects method by removing the weighted 
average output growth rates by from the individual country’s growth rate to better capture the true ‘common’ part of 
the shock. Results hold up to this change.  
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that can be re-written as:  
𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖
𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
=  
𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖
(𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖 ± 𝑓)
 
(𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖 ± 𝑓)
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖
 
where f stands for the fiscal policy instrument. This framework, allows us to distinguish between the 
smoothing role of private saving and the role of various components of fiscal policy that, which by 
construction sum up to the public sector net saving. Thus, overall, we provide a complete picture of the 
role of government consumption smoothing via the use of the national budget. Namely we estimate the 
smoothing properties of government consumption, transfers, subsidies on the expenditure side; and 
social contributions, direct and indirect taxes on the revenue side.  
We estimate the following equations: 
Fiscal policy element (x): ∆ log 𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 −  ∆ log(𝐷𝑁𝐼 ± 𝑥)𝑖,𝑡   =  𝑎𝑡
𝑖𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖𝑓∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
Total Public Saving: ∆ log 𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 −  ∆ log(𝐷𝑁𝐼 − 𝑝𝑢𝑏 𝑠𝑎𝑣)𝑖,𝑡   =  𝑎𝑡
𝑝𝑢 𝑠 + 𝛽𝑝𝑢𝑏 𝑠∆ log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
Where f is positive for any type of government expenditure, and negative for revenue components. The 
coefficient estimates measure the fraction of shocks to GDP absorbed by the various domestic fiscal 
policy instruments. We thus measure the fraction of the cross-sectional variability in GDP that is 
absorbed by different types of fiscal components. Note that portion of shocks smoothed via the 
components of the general government saving are simply an additional decomposition of the portion 
of shocks smoothed via total net saving. The remainder is the amount smoothed privately.  
Income insurance via the federal tax and transfer system 
Measuring the extent to which the different components of the federal system of taxes and transfers 
provide insurance is straightforward from the framework presented above. Following the methodology 
and the variable constructed in Asdrubali et al. (1996) the analysis uses per capita net fiscal transfers 
from the government to a state i, which is defined as the difference between per capita disposable 
income (after net transfers). Similarly to the method presented in section 2.1, we take the logarithms 
of the first differenced variables, and multiply both sides of the equation by D.log (GSP), minus its mean 
for every year, and compute the expected value, which yields the following variance decomposition of 
GSP: 
In particular we estimate the following equation: 
Risk − sharing federal budget via f ∶  ∆ log 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − ∆ log  (𝑆𝐼 + 𝑓) =  𝑎𝑡
𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡∆ log 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
Risk − sharing Federal tax and transfers: ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡  =  𝑎𝑡
𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
The idea is that there the federal budget provides fiscal risk sharing if:  
(State income/State income + f ) 
moves positively with State income, when f = (+) Transfer and f= (-)Tax. Thus, if state income increases, 
the rise in SI + federal transfer should be smaller.  
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One crucial feature of the estimation concerns the introduction of time fixed effects, which capture the 
common aggregate year specific effects on output growth. Time fixed capture the aggregate effects on 
US-wide GDP. As such the shocks are measured relative to the average growth rate among US states.21  
  
                                                     
21 Asdrubali et al. (1996) show that the coefficient from such regressions with time fixed effects boils down to a weighted 
average of the coefficients that would be estimated from year-by-year cross-sectional regressions.  
26  ALCIDI & THIRION 
 
Annex B. Government budgets decomposition and shock smoothing 
Table B1. Composition of national government savings in the EA11, periphery and core (% of GDP) 
 1995-2013 2008-2013 
 EA11 PERIPHERY CORE EA11 PERIPHERY CORE 
Revenues  40.5% 36.2% 44.0% 40.6% 36.7% 43.8% 
Social contributions (+) 13.4% 10.8% 15.6% 13.6% 11.4% 15.4% 
Other revenues(+) 2.1% 1.9% 2.2% 2.2% 2.0% 2.4% 
Indirect tax (+) 12.8% 12.7% 13.0% 12.6% 12.3% 12.9% 
Direct tax (+) 12.2% 10.9% 13.3% 12.1% 11.0% 13.1% 
Expenditure 42.2% 39.1% 44.8% 44.5% 43.1% 45.7% 
Transfers (-) 17.1% 15.4% 18.6% 18.6% 18.3% 18.9% 
Subsidies (-) 1.3% 0.9% 1.7% 1.4% 0.9% 1.7% 
Other sp (-) 3.7% 4.2% 3.2% 3.1% 3.9% 2.4% 
Government Cons (-) 20.1% 18.5% 21.4% 21.4% 20.0% 22.6% 
Source: OECD, detailed national accounts. 
 
Table B2. Decomposition of transfers to individuals in the EA11, periphery and core (% of GDP)  
 1995-2013 2008-2013 
 EA11 PERIPHERY CORE EA11 PERIPHERY CORE 
Old age 8.5% 8.4% 8.5% 9.5% 9.7% 9.3% 
Survivors 1.6% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.9% 1.4% 
Incapacity related 2.6% 1.9% 3.2% 2.6% 2.0% 3.0% 
Family 2.0% 1.4% 2.5% 2.2% 1.8% 2.5% 
Active labour market  0.8% 0.6% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 0.9% 
Unemployment 1.6% 1.3% 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 1.7% 
Housing 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 
Other social policy areas 0.4% 0.2% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.6% 
Health 6.1% 5.6% 6.5% 6.8% 6.4% 7.2% 
Total 23.7% 21.1% 25.9% 26.0% 24.7% 27.1% 
Total - health (Transfers) 17.6% 15.5% 19.4% 19.2% 18.3% 19.9% 
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure Database. 
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Table B3. Average federal disbursements/receipts (% of US GDP) 
 1980-1995 1996-2007 2008-2013 
Total Revenue 17.2% 17.5% 15.5% 
Personal income tax 7.9% 8.2% 7.1% 
Corporate income tax 1.6% 1.8% 1.6% 
Social security contributions 6.1% 6.2% 5.7% 
Unemployment contributions 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 
Other tax (excise) 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 
Total Expenditure 11.5% 11.9% 15.0% 
Aid to state (grants) 2.6% 3.1% 3.7% 
Unemployment benefits 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 
Other direct transfers (Old age, health...) 8.4% 8.5% 10.6% 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Department of Commerce. 
 
Table B4. Government shock smoothing in the EA11 
1995-2013 Time FE 
Total smoothing 19.8 
Expenditure  
Unemployment benefits 4.6*** 
Transfers (other than UB) 11*** 
Subsidies 1.3*** 
Government consumption 13*** 
Other expenditure -1 
Revenue  
Indirect tax -5 
Direct tax -1 
Social contribution -2.3 
Other revenues 4*** 
Notes: Equations are estimated using OLS with time fixed effects, correcting for AR(1) process in the error term. 
Standard errors are corrected for panel heteroscedasticity. 
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Table B5. Federal fiscal risk sharing in the US 
1980 2013 Time FE 
Total smoothing 11*** 
Expenditure   
Unemployment benefits 1*** 
Transfers (other than UI) 5.3*** 
Federal grants 1.8*** 
Revenue  
Direct federal tax 3*** 
UI contributions -0.2*** 
Corporate tax -0.2*** 
Social security contributions -0.5*** 
Other indirect taxes -0.1*** 
Notes: Equations are estimated using OLS with time fixed effects, correcting for AR(1) process in the error term. 
Standard errors are corrected for panel heteroscedasticity. 
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Table B6. Overview of unemployment insurance in the US, by programme 
 Basic unemployment 
benefits 
Extended Benefits (EB) 
program (permanent) 
Emergency benefit 
(Discretionary temporary 
federal programs) 
Economic 
circumstances 
All times Asymmetric unemployment 
shock to a state.  Does not 
pre-requisite a nation-wide 
recession 
Nation-wide recession 
(common shock). e.g. 
Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation (June 2008 
through December 2013) 
Duration Generally up to 26 weeks Additional 13-20 weeks after 
exhaustion of regular 
benefits. Total number of 
weeks depends on state’s 
unemployment rate 
Note: The 2009 Recovery 
Act authorised temporary 
full federal funding through 
2013 
EUC provided 34 weeks of 
emergency federal benefits 
in all states, and up to 53 
weeks in states with 
unemployment rate > 8.5%  
Also contribute to inter-
temporal stabilisation 
Trigger Anyone losing his/her job 
for no fault of their own and 
eligible. 
Based on the level of insured 
unemployment rate  
Triggered when the average 
insured unemployment rate 
(IUR) for the previous 13 
weeks is at least 5% and is 
120% of the rates for the 
previous 2 years. Certain 
provisions allow states to 
choose to extend benefits 
Federal discretionary action 
Funding i) State’s trust funds 
ii) A credit line is available 
from Federal 
Unemployment Account 
(FUA) If state UI account is 
insolvent. 
50/50 (state/federal - FUA) 
i) State’s trust funds 
ii) If insolvent: a Credit line 
is available through Federal 
Unemployment Account 
(FUA)  
- Fully covered by the federal 
government in 2008-2013 
Emergency benefits are 
based on Congressional 
discretion and are paid 
primarily from General 
Revenues 
Type of 
insurance 
Self-insurance: states have 
an account at the Treasury, 
from which they draw upon 
or contribute depending on 
the cycle  
Corrective mechanism: 
automatically adjust 
contributions if funds not 
reimbursed within 2 years 
(FUTA increases). 
Self-insurance and risk 
sharing: This mechanism 
includes some proper risk 
sharing (50% of the extra 
cost). Funded by the fund 
created out of the federal 
tax  
Inter-state and inter-
generational risk sharing 
through the federal budget 
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